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Mandate for negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe
1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 wrth 2 abstentrons.
2. Mernbers qf the commrttee: Mr. Kiltelmann (Chairman); MM. Fourre (Alternate: Baumel), de Beer (Vice-Chairmen)l
Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Carigha (Alternate: Llezzapesa), Cox,De Decker. Derycke (Alternate. Kernprnarre).
Ettng, Fiandrottr, Frllon. Fioret (Alternale'. Fassuto), Irmer, Jung, Konen, de Kv'aadslentel, Mrs. Lalumiere, MM. Pecchioli,
Scheer (Alternate: ,-lntretter), Srnesro. Sir Dudlel, Smrth, MM. Specd, Steiner (Alternate: Kleldzrnskr), Steverlynck (Alternate:
Uvttendaele), Sr John Stokes, Mr. Zierer.
N.B. i"fte names o.[ those takmg part rn the vote are prrnted rn rtaltcs.
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Rapporteur's Preface
In preparation for this report, the Rapporteur had interviews with the following permanent repre-
sentatit'es to conlentrcnal arms control talks and their sta-ff m l,'ienna on 2lst and 22nd February 1989:
H.E. Mr. L.W. Veenendaal, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation;
Brigadier-General C. Kuypers, Defence Adviser. Netherlands Delegation;
H.E. Mr. G. Joetze, Ambassador. Head of the Federal German Delegationl
Mr. J. Pohlmann, Deputy Head of the Federal German Delegationl
Mr. E. Duchene, Deputy Head of the Belgian Delegation;
Mr. John D. Bryson, Deputy Head of the Canadian Delegation;
H.E. Mr. T. Strulak, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation:
Mr. L. Breckon, Deputy Head of the United States Delegation;
Mr. D.J. Bowen, Deputy Head of the United Krngdom Delegation;
Mr. B.E. Cleghorn, Deputy Head of the United Kingdom Delegation:
H.E. Mr. Gleissner, Ambassador, Head of Arms Control Department, Austrian Ministry for
Foreign Affairs;
Mr. L Broz, Deputy Head of the Czechoslovakian Delegation.
He was also briefed inthe Itrternational Institute.for Strategic Studies f/Ist, London, on 3rd April
1989, by:
Colonel John Cross, Deputy Director;
Colonel Andrew Duncan, Assistant Director for Information.
The committee as a w'hole was addressed by The Hon. Archie Hamilton, MP, United Kingdom
Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, in London, on 3rd November 1988, and by
Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevdnement, French Minister of Defence, in Paris, on 6th February 1989: and by Sir
Geoffrey Howe, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and The Rt. Hon. George
Younger. United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, in London. on 4th April 1989.
The committee and the Rapporteur wish to express their special thanks to all the ministers, offi-
cials and senior officers who briefed the Rapporteur or the committee and replied to questions.
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Draft Recommendation
on current aspects of arms control: the Western European position
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the successful outcome of the third review conference in Vienna in Ja-nuary 1989, and
more specifically the signing of the mandate for negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe
and the promising start to these negotiationsl
(i, Stressing that the mistakes which hampered the MBFR negotiations should not be repeated, espe-
ciilly the disagleements over actual numbers and the quality of weapons systems and military personnel
and differences regarding an effective and strict verification regime:
(ii, Certain that it is in the interests of all twenty-three participants in the CFE talks that the negotia-
tions should be fruitful and harmonious, avoiding any unnecessary obstructive action;
(tv) Considering that political reality calls for equal ceilings of armaments and troops, visibly lower
than the present NATO levels;
6,) Convinced that the absence of offensive equipment near the contact line would strengthen mutual
confidence;
(vr) Recognising that SNF weapons are part of a credible deterrent - even with a balance of conven-
tional armamenti- and that a mix of nuclear and conventional weapons remains a necessity in the fore-
seeable future;
6'ii) Noting, however, that time is required for further technical and tactical research on a replacement
for the Lance missile and that a final decision about production does not require to be taken at present
in consideration of the CFE talks;
(t,iii) IJndedining the useful contribution to mutual confidence-building which would result from the
publication of detailed and clear defence budgets,
RrconlrnNps rHAT rsr CouNctI-
1. Strive for simple definitions of equal ceilings in which qualitative complications should be
avoided insofar as poisible, and take the view that disagreements about the actual numbers of forces is a
matter of secondary importancel
2. Advocate that. for the sake of effective and strict verification, the exchanges of information men-
tioned in the mandate should refer not only to levels of armaments and military personnel but also exact
locations,
3. Take the necessary steps to ensure that practical research is carried out by WEU on the vital
subject of verification and report fully to the Assembly;
4. Consider the possibility of including in the CFE talks all conventional weapons systems which are
not explicitly excluded in the mandate, if this is essential for both parties for the smooth progress of the
negotiations;
5. Aim to achieve equal ceilings by asymmetrical reductions, lower than the present NATO levels, a
100/o reduction in tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and artillery being a provisional goal;
6. Participate in all the preparations necessary for replacing the Lance missile, but decide on
production/deployment at a later time;
7 . Promote the publication of complete, detailed and clear defence budgets by all participants in the
CSCE talks;
8. Urge the Chairman-in-Office to establish at the highest level in his country's delegation in Vienna,
a WEU liaison officer for the CFE talks.
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E xp lanatory Memorandum
(submitted b1' Mr. de Beer, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1.1. Writing a report on " Current aspects of
arms control " at the moment is a fascinating but
risky matter: fascinating, because we are experi-
enclng an improvement in East-West relations
which until recently very few would have judged
possiblel risk1,, because events present them-
selves at such a high speed that what is written
today might land in the wastepaper basket
tomorrow and maybe this is why the annual
report of the Council allows little opportunity for
any comment on its work in the arms control
domain! Your Rapporteur feels that the best
course is therefore to begin with a consideration
of the background setting.
1.2. It would be a mistake to assume that
" glasnost " and " perestroika " are the products
of new idealism in the Kremlin. They are
nothing more than a necessity for Russian
society. for the following reasons:
(i) the centralistic socialist economy is
failing. The quality of life lags further
and further behind that of the West.
This is not only true for material
aspects. but for less usual ones, like
the environment, as well:
fti) we are on the yerge of a new
worldwide industrial revolution. The
keywords are: " information tech-
nology ". The most advanced coun-
tries will experience the greatest
growth of prosperity. Information
technology, however, can only thrive
in an open society where information
is freely available. The base necessary
is a society which is used to handling
freedom of expression and differences
of opinion:
(iii) lhe Eastern European countries spend
a much larger part of their national
incomes on defence than do the coun-
tries of WEU. which weighs heavily
on their relatively poor standard of
living and increases the discontent of
the population.
1.3. Apparently Mr. Gorbachev is convinced
that glasnost. perestroika and cutting the defence
budget are necessary to keep pace with the West.
His new course certainly opens prospects for his
own country. but for us as well. His success,
however, is far from secure. He still has to go a
very long way and he must take account of the
resistance of the conservative faction in the
Kremlin and of the party oflicials in the countr).
who do not want to give up their privileged posi-
tions so easily. For him. two issues are of crucial
interest. In the first place the living standards of
the Soviet Union have to rise. " What benefits do
we have from glasnost and perestroika ". many
Russians ask themselves. " if we still have to
queue for lots of daily needs? ". Secondly, his
foreign affairs policy should be successful in the
opinion of the other Soviet party leaders. There
is a fair chance that the hard line in the Kremlin
will prevail again, should he fail.
1.4. Where information technology is con-
cerned, what is true for the civilian sector also
applies to the military and the Soviets must be
aware that they are increasingly likely to trail the
West. which would diminish any chance of
rebuilding their economy even further.
1.5. The question arises, under current circum-
stances what would be the most sensible attitude
for the West? It is quite clear that the Eastern
European countriei need a considerable
reduction in their defence budgets 
- 
more than
we do. The intended unilateral reduction of the
conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries is a clear indication. The West could quietly
wait and see how things are developing in the
East, scarcely making any concessions, expecting
that the advantages will automatically fall into
our lap.
1.6. It is your Rapporteur's opinion that this
would not be a very wise move. By doing this we
would give away the initiative. Furthermore, we
too have a lot to gain. The offensive capacity of
the Warsaw Pact forces is still a serious threat to
us. Worse, this threat increases with the imple-
mentation of the INF treaty. The elimination of
medium-range nuclear weapons makes the
Warsaw Pact's preponderance of tanks.
armoured vehicles and artillery in the European
theatre even more significant. An asymmetrical
reduction of conventional armaments is now
more vital than ever for our security. On top ofthis, " burden-sharing ", more and more
emphasised by the USA, faces the WEU coun-
tries with higher expenditure for defence in the
near future. A lightening of our defence task
would therefore be welcome.
1.7 . The conclusion is that, whereas the
Warsaw Pact countries need a reduction of
armed forces very badly, we too have a special
interest in the successful outcome of the CFE
talks. We should not let a favourable moment
pass by. We must negotiate toughly at the CSCE
DOCUMENT I182
and CFE talks. but at the same time we cannot
avoid taking Mr. Gorbachev's position into con-
sideration. If we do not, we may spoil our own
chances.
II. A brief retrospect
2.1. A chronological review of arms control
negotiations over the last fifteen years makes
interesting readingr:
- 
1973 (July)
Start ofthe Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Hel-
sinki.
- 
1973 (October)
Start of the negotiations on Mutual and
Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in
Vienna. In the course of the seventies,
parties agree on the hnal aim: reduction
of military personnel to a ceiling of
900 000 men (of whom 700 000 army
personnel); the USA and USSR taking
the lead. Disagreements about the
correct numbers of present forces and
the rssue of national versus collective
ceilings prevent an agreement.
- 
1915 (August)
Signing of the Helsinki Final Act. ln the
so-called hrst basket (military security),
the countries promise to take various
confidence-building measures such as
the announcement of manceuvres and
the exchange of observers.
- 
1976 (December)
In Vienna, the West proposes deleting
Russian tanks against American nuclear
weapons. This so-called third option is
the only occasion when NATO took up
the wish from the eastern side to nego-
tiate not only manpower but arma-
ments as well. In 1979, when the USA
decides on the unilateral withdrawal of
I 000 nuclear warheads from Europe as
part of the dual-track decision, this
third option vanishes.
- 
t91t-t978
First follow-up conference to the Hel-
sinki Final Act in Belgrade.
- 
1980-1983
Second follow-up conference to the Hel-
sinki Final Act in Madrid.
- 
1983
In Montebello. NATO decides to reduce
and replace shorter intermediate-range
(SRINF) and short-range (SNF) nuclear
forces.
1. Source: " The C(A)FE negotiatrons in Vienna ", Nether-
lands Instltute for Internatronal Relations, " Clingendael ",
March 1989. Authors: J G. Siccama and C. Homan.
I 984
Start of the Conference on Disarm-
ament in Europe in Stockholm as a
sequel to the Madrid decisions.
1986 (May)
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
NATO member countries at their
meeting in Halifax establish a " high-
Ievel task force ", which should take
" bold new steps " concerning conven-
tional arms reductions.
1986 (June)
In the Budapest appeal, the Warsaw
Treatl' proposes the mutual reduction of
armed forces by 100 000 to 150 000
men in the next two years. Reductions
of 25o/o should follow, which, according
to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.
would amount to the same as reduc-
tions of half a million men on both
sides.
1986 (September)
At the Conference on Disarmament in
Europe in Stockholm. an agreement is
obtained on " confidence- and security-
building measures " 
- 
amongst others
the announcement of troop movements
greater than 13 000 men. The USSR
accepts on-sile inspections.
1986 (November)
Start of the third follow-up conference
to the Helsinki Final Act in Vienna.
One of the issues is a mandate for " con-
ventional stability talks (CST) ":
changed (in 1989) into " conventional
armed forces in Europe " (CFE).
1987 (April)
During a speech in Brussels, the
American Senator Sam Nunn pleads for
an agreement on two points: (, a
Russian reduction in Central Europe of
l3 divisions (or more) in exchange for
an American reduction of 2 divisions(or more)i (iy' mutual promises of no
first use of nuclear weapons.
1987 (May)
At a conference in East Berlin. the
Warsaw Treaty Organisation gives pri-
ority to the removal of the most
offensive weapons from Central Europe
in order to reduce the danger of a sur-
prise attack. Nuclear weapons should be
part of the negotiations. NATO and the
Warsaw Pact should start talks about
their military doctrines.
1987 (June)
The North Atlantic Council declares at
its meeting in Reykjavik that reductions
in Russian and American nuclear short-
range armaments are only possible " in
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conjunction with " a conventional balance and a
worldwide ban on chemical weapons. The total
approach on arms control by the alliance will be
elaborated in a " comprehensive concept ".
- 
1987 (November)
A RAND-study concludes that military
stability in Europe will be increased
only when the Warsaw Pact makes
asymmetric reductions of 5 to I (or
more).
- 
1987 (November)
General Jaruzelski proposes an
exchange of tanks (on the Warsaw Pact
side) against aircraft (on the NATO
side).
- 
1987 (December)
The signing of the INF treaty between
the USA and the USSR in Washington.
A global prohibition on the possession
of intermediate-range nuclear forces 2.
- 
1988 (March)
The communique of the NATO summit
in Brussels announces that NATO will,
within the framework of CST, aim at:
- 
the establishment of a secure and
stable balance of conventional armed
forces at lower ceilings;
- 
doing away with the inequalities
which have a negative influence on
stability and security:
- 
(as a matter of priority) abolishing
any capability to start a surprise
attack and undertake large-scale
offensive action. In order to maintain
the deterrent, a mix of conventional
and nuclear armaments, which must
be kept up to date, remains nec-
essary.
- 
1988 (7th December)
In a speech to the United Nations in
New York, the Soviet leader, Mr.
Gorbachev, announces that his country
will withdraw 50 000 men and 5 000
tanks from Eastern Europe 3. Six tank
divisions, Iocated in the GDR, Czecho-
slovakia and Hungary will be dis-
banded.
- 
1988 (8th December)
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
NATO countries propose in Brussels to
reduce the total number of tanks in
Europe to 40 000 (20 000 for NATO
and 20 000 for the Warsaw Pact).
2. For detarls see report on " Disarmament 
- 
reply to the
thirty-third annual report of the Council ", Document 1158.
3rd November 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Tummers.
3. Total numbers of unrlateral reductions announced are:
500 000 men and 10 000 tanks. 8 500 artillery pieces and 800
combat arrcraft.
- 
1989 (17th January)
The signing of the final document of the
third follow-up conference of the CSCE
in Vienna. It contains the mandate for
the " negotiation on conventional
armed forces in Europe ", which started
on 9th March in Vienna.
2.2. The MBFR talks, which began in October
1973 in Vienna. were limited to conventional
forces. Seven NATO and four Warsaw Pact
member countries took part: Belgium, Canada,FRG, Luxembourg, Netherlands. United
Kingdom, United States, Czechoslovakia, GDR,
Poland and the USSR. They silted up after a
promising start 
- 
mainly because of disagree-
ments over actual numbers and the quality of
weapons systems and military personnel, and
differences regarding an effective and strict veri-
fication system. After fifteen years, the MBFR
negotiations are now formally finished. No con-
sensus has been achieved but it is important that
we learn a lesson from the mistakes made.
III. A fresh start in Yienna
3.1. A fresh start was made with the Con-
cluding Document of the Vienna Meeting on
17th January 1989. All twenty-three NATO and
Warsaw Pact countries are taking part in the
CFE (conventional forces in Europe) talks. An
outline for the negotiations has been given in a
special mandate. signed by all twenty-three par-
ticipants. The aim is to arrive at the estab-
lishment of a stable and secure balance of con-
ventional armed forces (which include
conventional armaments and equipment), at
lower levels in Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals; the elimination of disparities prejudicial
to stability and secunty; and the elimination, as a
matter of priority, of the capability for launching
surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale
offensive action. These objectives shall be
achieved by the application of militarily signif-
icant measures such as reductions, limitations,
redeployment, equal ceilings and related mea-
sures, amongst others.
3.2. In the paragraphs of the mandate outlining
" objectives and methods ", reference is made in
particular to " the elimination, as a matter of pri-
ority, of the capability for launching surprise
attack and for initiating large-scale offensive
action. ". " Offensive action " for all Europeans,
both in West and East is almost synonymous
with the use of armoured vehicles and it is no
coincidence that it is on the elimination of the
present asymmetries and real reductions (on
both sides) that the talks need to be focused.
Which is why alliance nations particularly wish
to see the categories of equipment for future cuts
restricted initially to tanks, artillery and
armoured fighting vehicles.
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3.3. Other important aspects are:
- 
the subject shall be conventional armed
forces, but the existence of multiple
capabilities will not be a criterion for
modifying the scope of the negotia-
tions:
- 
nuclear weapons will not be a subject of
these negotiationsl
- 
naval forces and chemical weapons will
not be discussedl
- 
there will be an effective and strict yeri-
fication system which will include
on-site inspections as a matter of
right:
- 
information shall be exchanged about
the capabilities of the forces involved;
- 
agreements reached shall be interna-
tionally binding.
IY. Mandate for negotiation
on conventional armed forces in Europe
(The complete text of the nrundate
is reproduced at appendx)
4.1. With regard to Western European Union,
the first item which is remarkable is the
inclusion. in the opening paragraphs of the
mandate itself, of specific reference to the Treaty
of Brussels (1948). This reference was apparently
included at the direct instigation of the French
authorities in an effort to play down the " bloc to
bloc " connotations of mentioning both the
Washington (1949) and Warsaw (1955)
Treaties.
4.2. Of course the implications and possible
advantages of this specific reference to the
Brussels Treaty are potentially many, although,
whether for example, France, in particular, or
any other member nation would go so far as
attempting to propose a WEU caucus as a " club
within a club " (or " bloc within a bloc " ) on the
western side is debatable. The place for such dis-
cussion and formulation of a staunchly Western
European attitude is obviously hrst and foremost
in the WEU Council and its sub-groups: a move
which the Assembly has advocated on a number
of recent occasions {. The Committee on Defence
Questions and Armaments was delighted to hear
from the Chairman-in-Oflice on 4th April 1989
thatjust such a discussion had taken place at the
full Council meeting the preceding day.
(i) Force let'els
4.3. Quite apart from the preparation,
therefore, of positions before the CFE talks
began, and on a quasi-permanent basis once they
4. " Drsarmament (the prospects for Western Europe after
the Moscow summrt)". 7th June 1988, Documeri ll4'7,
Rapporteur: Mr. Krttelmann. and " Disarmament - reply to
the thirty-third annual report of the Council ", 3rd November
1988, Document 1158. Rapporteur: Mr. Tummers.
are in progress, the most evident competence of
WEU is in relation to the reduced force levels
which one hopes will result from the negotiation
(the subject of a parallel report by the Committee
on Defence Questions and Armaments: " Force
comparisons ", Rapporteur: Mr. Steiner). Under
the terms of Article VI of Protocol No. II to the
modified Brussels Treaty, the United Kingdom
undertook to " ...maintain on the mainland of
Europe, including Germany, the effective
strength of the United Kingdom forces which are
now assigned to the Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe, that is to say four divisions and
the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other
forces as the Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, regards as having equivalent f,rghting
capacity ". The United Kingdom undertook
" not to withdraw these forces against the wishes
of the majority of the high contracting
parties... ". In accordance with the procedure
provided for in that article, the WEU Council
subsequently acquiesced in the United
Kingdom's request to reduce the levels of forces
it maintains on the mainland of Europe, and the
level now agreed is 55 000 men plus a tactical air
force.
4.4. In the report on " Disarmament - reply to
the thirty-third annual report of the Council "
prepared for the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments in November 1988
(Rapporteur: Mr. Tummers), it was pointed out
(paragraph 2.31) that " Where levels of forces
present in Germany are concerned, the com-
mittee would like to underline the importance of
maintaining agreed numbers and not making
unilateral reductions, unless and until agreed and
verifiable multilateral arms control measures are
negotiated. "
4.5. Current British force levels in the Federal
Republic of Germany may eventually have to be
reduced as a result ofthese negotiations, but such
reductions would have to involve the necessary
legal steps within Western European Union
before implementation. Similarly. the maximum
levels of ground and air forces which member
states of WEU place under NATO command are
fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the
modified Brussels Treaty and these limits also
would probably have to be reconsidered and
reviewed.
4.6. In the context of possible revision of the
Brussels Treaty as a result of the recent
enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and
Spain s, the implications of this link with the
CFE/CSCE talks in Vienna are considerable and
should not be neglected as the Council formu-
lates its attitudes and proposals on both counts
during the coming months.
5. See " Future of European secunty - reply to the annual
report ofthe Council ". report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden
on behalf of the General Affarrs Commrttee.
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4.7. What Mr. Gorbachev's and his colleagues'
apparent readiness to make radical cuts has done
is to transform the outlook for the Vienna nego-
tiations, raising expectations ofquick progress. A
breakthrough in this particular domain, by
blunting the most threatening aspect of Soviet
military power, could simplify and probably
accelerate progress in other talks ranging from
chemical weapons even to nuclear arms in
Europe... By eliminating Warsaw Pact superi-
onty in tanks, artillery and armoured fighting
vehicles, the risk of a surprise eastern offensive
which could sei;e and hold territory in Western
Europe would be considerably reduced.
Throughout the talks the simple criterion in
assessing whether or not a particular weapons
system can or cannot " seize and hold territory "
should be borne in mind when deciding an order
of pnorities for reductions and limitations.
4.8. It is worth noting " en passant " that
realists in the arms control world are fully aware
that disarmament does not necessarily always
mean vast reductions in defence spending. On
occasion, what is involved is a simple redistri-
bution of arms expenditure; for example, the
GDR's leader, Mr. Honecker, has already
coupled reductions of his country's of[ensive
weapons with a parallel increase in numbers of
anti-tank weapons and anti-tank artillery. (GDR
proposals include reductions in tanks, and
cutting the army by l0 000 men and defence
expenditure by 100/o; it is, of course, these reduc-
tions which are given considerable publicity,
rather than increases in spending in other
areas.)
(ii) I'{at,al forces
4.9. In spite of the careful wording of the
agreed mandate, there is nonetheless a strong
probability that different participants will seek to
draw particular advantage from their own inter-
pretation and, even where specific exclusions
apply (such as " naval forces " or " nuclear
weapons " ), attempts are already being made at
linkage: implying that agreement in this forum
might depend on progress in other realms. Naval
forces are excluded from the CFE talks for good
reasons: hrstly, navies operate worldwide, they
are not bound to the European theatre of opera-
tions; secondly, the Atlantic Ocean for NATO is
the hinterland of Europe just as Russia is for the
countries of the Warsaw Pact (i.e. a line of supply
for reinforcement in case of military conflict). It
is reasonable therefore for NATO to have the
right to a strong surface fleet to guarantee the
security of its sea-lines of communication.
Although it may be true that NATO has a pre-
ponderance of surface vessels, the Soviet Union
has a preponderance of attack submarines.
4.10. Soviet submarines pose a specific problem
also which is worth highlighting because of other
implications. Many such submarines are double-
hulled and built of titanium. The main way for
western navies to counter the threat they pose is
to use nuclear depth charges against them as con-
ventional torpedoes are of little effect. And these
weapons are replaced or updated as necessary
without seemingly arousing the same furore
involved in replacing other tactical nuclear
weapons... However, including such considera-
tions. and indeed naval forces generally, in the
present talks would immensely complicate
them!
(iii) Troops
4.1 l. Less important than the main items of
equipment covered by the mandate are the
troops who man the equipment. MBFR should
have taught the participants a salutory lesson:
not to waste time counting heads to establish
numbers which will then prove virtually impos-
sible to verify. Discussions must concentrate on
units and equipment: reductions in equipment
should imply reductions in manpower as a direct
result. (As a matter of interest, this same
argument is currently being used in Washington
to justify Republican Congressman Ireland's res-
olution to reduce United States troops in Europe
- 
by withdrawing the crews and those respon-
sible for the maintenance and guarding of the
cruise missiles to be abolished as a result of the
INF agreement.) Quite apart from effectively
diminishing the perceived threat, troop reduc-
tions will suit most countries concerned, particu-
larly as the " demographic trough " begins to take
effect over the next ten vears or so.
(il " Zones "
4.12. Although a priori WEU has, because of its
membership, concentrated hitherto on the
central front in Europe, that should not neces-
sarily mean that a " zonal approach " at the CFE
talks is to be preferred. The " flank countries "(Turkey especially, in the south, and Norway
particularly, in the north) are already concerned
that their interests may be neglected. These
interests are highlighted with respect to the
northern flank in another report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 6,
as they were with respect to the south in
1986 ?.
4.13 Another aspect of the problem of " zones "
is the Soviet proposal to create " special cor-
ridors ": strips along the border between East and
West where military activities and arms,
including nuclear weapons, would be severely
limited. Such an idea perpetuates the
" nuclear-free zone " theme which the Soviets
have frequently advanced in the past. The main
effect of such an idea would be to limit western
room for manceuyre (literally so) in the Federal
6. " State of European secunty 
- 
intervention forces and
rernforcement for the centre and the north ", Rapporteur: Mr.
Speed.
7. European securrty and the Medtterranean ", l4th October
1986, Document 1073, Rapporteur: Mr. Kittelmann.
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Republic while leaving the East full potential for
organising attack forces well behind its own
lines. One quick glance at the map of Europe
would be enough to realise that such proposals
are highly unfavourable for WEU. They interfere
with the NATO conception of forward defence.
Nevertheless, we should consider the possibility
of the creation of " defensive zones ", free of
equipment, specifically designed for aggression:
such as bridge-building materials. A defensive
army, not prepared for a surprise attack, does not
need such equipment in a forward position. The
zones could have a width of, say, 100 km. This
idea could be a contribution to confidence-
building in the framework of the actual talks.
4.14. A major advantage of proposing restric-
tions in certain areas or zones might be to spread
present concentrations of weapons throughout
Europe (both East and West) to lessen the like-
lihood of surprise gained through massive attack.
This is why the alliance has proposed special
restrictions on weapons deployed in the area
comprised by East and West Germany, Czecho-
slovakia, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands. Again, the prospect for the alliance flank
countries of increased concentrations of weapons
on their doorsteps as a result of redistribution, is
not to be relished. Incidentally, for the Chinese
the prospect of greater numbers of Soviet troops
and armour East of the Urals is equally
unwelcome although Mr. Gorbachev has
recently tried to allay Chinese alarm by
announcing considerable reductions (reportedly
virtually four fifths of the 55 000 troops present)
in the forces stationed in Mongolia.
Y. Verification
5.1. The one aspect of the mandate which
seems to attract universal consensus is, of course,
that of verification, the importance of which has
been emphasised now on numerous occasions by
the Assembly in general and the Committee on
Defence Questions and Armaments in particular.
It is open to all nations to make whatever use is
considered necessary of their own " technical
means " to ensure adequate and suflicient venfi-
cation of agreements, but in addition, because of
the successful use of on-site inspections in the
INF agreement, both sides appear to have
accepted the general principle (which also applies
to the " basing countries " involved and not just
the two signatories). However, although the prin-
ciple has been achieved, the practice of proce-
dures on the enormous scale envisaged for the
wide range of equipments now listed remains to
be determined and will occupy a great deal of
research and debate before the modalities are
agreed.
5.2. The wording in the mandate indicates that
both parties agree on the necessity ofa thorough
verification system to ensure the success of any
arms control agreement. As we all know, verifi-
cation has always been an essential issue for the
West. Earlier proposals from the Warsaw Treaty
countries have been rejected because they lacked
reliable verification.
5.3. The INF treaty too contains provision for
verification; but there the problem is much
easier in practice. With the INF treaty all
weapons systems concerned are eliminated. The
inspections (including possibly the use of satel-
lites) will be limited to the question of whether
missiles are there or not. With the CFE talks, the
issue is not elimination of whole systems but
reduction to certain levels. That requires
counting. Counting, however, is not possible
without adequate data of numbers, location, etc.,
etc.
5.4. It therefore seems unavoidable that verifi-
cation in the CFE context should be matched
with an exact description by the participating
countries of what weapons systems are where
and possibly even details of stationing of military
personnel. Even then, verification will give us
many practical problems, mainly because of the
extent of territory involved and the numbers
concerned.
5.5. Your Rapporteur, like all other recent
Rapporteurs of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments, is convinced that Western
European Union should and must contribute to
the verification process along the lines previ-
ously recommended 8. It is essential that the
Council should ensure as a matter of urgency
that practical research is carried out by WEU as
such on this vital subject and made public.
YL Prospects
6.1. When talking to the various national dele-
gations, the Rapporteur encountered a general
feeling that the prospects are favourable. There
are signs of goodwill from the Warsaw Pact
members. After years of stagnation we now see a
breakthrough on several points:
(a) the fact that verification is no longer a
stumbling-block;
(b) the publication of numbers in the
statement by the Committee of the
Ministers of Defence of the Warsaw
Pact member states, on 30th January
1989; with the implicit recognition of
their preponderance of tanks,
armoured vehicles and artillery;
8. See " Disarmament (the prospects for Western Europe
after the Moscow summrt) ", 7th June 1988, Document 1147,
Rapporteur: Mr. Krttelmanni " Drsarmament - reply to the
thirty-third annual report of the Council ", 3rd November
1988, Document 1158, Rapporteur: Mr. Tummers; and
" Verrfication: a future European satellite agency ". 3rd
November 1988, Document 1159, Rapporteur: Mr. Fourre.
DOCLIMENT 1 I82
(c) the publication of some defence
expenditure figures by a number of
Warsaw Pact countries, amongst others
the USSR (17.2 billion roubles worth
of running costs 
- 
clearly not including
capital costs); albeit still lacking any
details;
(d) nnilateral reductions, announced by
Mr. Gorbachev, as a first step, and
concerning 281 000 (240 000) per-
6.2. The most logical approach is, of course, to
negotiate equal ceilings without bothering too
much about the present numbers. It looks as if
this is what may happen. What is important to
establish in the opening rounds of the CFE nego-
tiations is a step-by-step approach: interim
accords even, rather than trying to establish base
line data before proposing reductions (a major
problem during the long years of the MBFR
talks). Efforts should be concentrated on levels to
be achieved and verified after reductions have
been implemented. It will also be necessary for
parallel reflection on equipment and system defi-
nitions sometimes at a fairly basic level: for
example in defining just what comprises a
" main battle tank " 
- 
a combination perhaps of
9. See " Atlantrc News " (edrtron 198911-2). The sources are:
- 
" The Milrtarl Balance 1988-89 ". IISS, London;
" Conventronal forces in Europe: the facts ", NATO,
November 1988;
- 
" Statement by the Committee of the Ministers of
Defence of the Warsaw Pact member states ".
January 1989.
sonnel, 1l 900 (10000) tanks. 9 130
(8 500) artillery and 930 (800) aircraft(the USSR's share being the numbers
in brackets).
There are potentially numerous pitfalls. The
parties concerned have very different estimates
of each other's numbers. These differences
cannot always be explained by different defini-
tions (e.g. of armoured vehicles). To summarise
the different estimates e:
weight, propulsion, armour, gun calibre, speed,
etc. This defining of systems is important from
another and related point of view: the " equal
ceilings " phrase written into the mandate.
" Equality " has different meanings: in thejudgment of some, the equality is simply
numeric; others believe that a qualitative
assessment as well as the quantitative is nec-
essary (e.9. " is a tank built this year worth two
made ten years ago? " ). The Comrnittee on
Defence Questions and Armaments has already
highlighted the thorny problem of quantity
versus qualityr0 and the subject will be further
considered in the committee's forthcoming
report on " Force comparisons " (Rapporteur:
Mr. Steiner) although your Rapporteur believes
that it would be wise not to go into too much
detail on the qualitative aspects, but stick to
straight numbers.
10. See " Threat assessment ", 2nd November
Document lll5. Rapporteur: Mr. Slokes.
NATO has, accordlng to: NATO rtself \*Iarsau Pact IISS
Military personnel (x I 000)
Tanks
2 214
t6 424
4 t53
t4 458
t8 240
2 4t9
3 977
2 487
30 690
46 900
57 060
18 070
5 270
5 450
2 340
22 200
6 200
13 500ll 000
864
4 393
Armoured vehicles
Artillerv
Anti-tank
Attack heliconters
Attack aircraft
The Warsaw Pact has. accordtng to' NATO Warsan' Pact
rtself
IISS
Military personnel (x 1000)
Tanks
3 090
5l 500
22 400
43 300
44 200
3 700
8 250
2 7',76
59 410
70 330tt 560
tr 465
2 785
5 355
2 t43
53 000
23 600
44 300
13 700
1 220
7 650
Armoured vehicles
Artillerv
Anti-tank weanons
Attack heliconters
Attack a ircraft
l0
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6.3. Furthermore, East and West do not agree
about the issue of aircraft (and helicopters). The
Warsaw Pact countries want them to be included
in the CFE; the NATO countries do not. The
mandate leaves this an open question on
purpose. It is generally assumed that NATO has
a qualitative preponderance of attack aircraft.
Apparently, the Warsaw Pact sees this as a
threat. If NATO withdrew some of its squadrons
to the USA, it would be considered as a
reduction in the definition of the mandate.
Rightly so, because the direct threat would be
reduced by a longer warning time. It would cer-
tainly be a concession by the West, which wouldjustify concessions from the East. On the other
hand, we should realise that in the case of an
unexpected military crisis, these squadrons could
be flown back to Europe within a few hours.
Therefore, the question seems justified if it is
correct for the West to see this as a predominant
issue. Proposals by NATO should include sub-
stantial reductions in due course in western
arsenals of such weapons.
6.4. Aircraft of whatever pnmary role(including " air defence " and " ground
support ") are obviously capable of surprise
attack by their very nature and it is exceedingly
difficult therefore not to include all categories for
consideration when it becomes a question of
reductions. In addition, although naval forces
per se are excluded from the mandate, what is the
position of naval air forces which are land-based
only and cannot be embarked (such as the
Federal German Navy's Tornadoes and most
maritime patrol aircraft. e.g. the P3 Orion)?
Detailed agreement on interpretation of the
" rules of the game " by all parties is vital if
progress is to be made. which means bringing
into the open issues such as those described
above. We should, however, realise that this con-
cerns only land-based aircraft in Europe.
6.5. The unilateral cuts already announced by
the USSR and its allies would bring the total
numbers of Warsaw Pact tanks in Eastern
Europe below the ceiling NATO had originally
planned to seek. The initial western proposal for
the CFE talks would have allowed some 12 800
tanks in Warsaw Pact countries outside the
Soviet Union, but President Gorbachev and
Eastern European governments have already
pledged cuts which would, if carried through in
entirety, leave only 1l 600. By now offering to
cut 100/o of western tanks (if not even more,
although a " zero option " in such weapons
cannot yet be contemplated: the tank raises far
more emotions than an intermediate-range
nuclear missile ever did!) instead of the 50/o first
considered, much greater Warsaw Pact reduc-
tions could be expected. Present Soviet conces-
sions on tanks do not fundamentally alter the
substance of the talks which involve a much
larger overall total of armoured fighting vehicles,
including thousands of tanks in western parts of
the Soviet Union.
6.6. It is evident that, in general, ceilings
should be visibly below the lowest one of the two
parties. Politically speaking, this is an absolute
necessity. Otherwise, it would be seen that the
Warsaw Pact is reducing forces and that NATO
is not. Besides, it is attractive to the West as well
as a means of reducing defence expenditure (and
appealing to public opinion).
6.7. Finally, the publication of a l-ew figures
from the defence budget by some Warsaw Pact
countries can only be a first step which should be
followed by further more complete details. Only
when the defence budgets of all the CSCE coun-
tries are as detailed and transparent as those of
the West can there be a substantive eflect on con-
fidence- and security-building.
YII. Most recent develoPments
1.1. The negotiations were resumed on 7th
March 1989. Both parties came with their
" opening bids ". The Warsaw Pact proposed
three stages:
Stage l: (1991-1994) with asymmetrical
reductions of attack aircraft and
helicopters, tanks, armoured
vehicles and artillery; 10 to l5olo
below the lowest party. SPecial
measures to Prevent surPrise
attack on both sides of the whole
of the contact line; the with-
drawal of offensive weapons and
several CSBM proposals.
Stage 2: (1994-1997) with the old
" Budapest 1986 " rdea of a
further 250lo reduction of troops
with their armaments.
Stage 3: (after 1997) with more reductions(not specified) to the level of
defensive armed forces, and
agreements on other weapons
systems).
7.2. NATO proposed equal ceilings at 5 to 100/o
below its actual level and no involvement of
attack aircraft in the CFE; numbers for NATO
and Warsaw Pact each should be: 20 000 tanks,
28 000 armoured vehicles and 16 500 artillery;
no country should have more than 30o/o of these
numbers; more ceilings for armed forces outside
own territory and specified regions. Apart from
the issue ofthe attack aircraft, these proposals do
not seem entirely incompatible.
VIII. Short-range nuclear forces
8.1. In the middle of the nineties, Lance mis-
siles will be obsolete and NATO countries will
have to make up their minds on their
l1
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replacement. The Montebello decision to reduce
the number of nuclear warheads to 4 500 pieces,
plays a r6le, as well as the recently developed
ideas about the " shift " 
- 
the replacement of
very short-range nuclear weapons (Lance and
artillery) by others with a somewhat longer range(but not more than 500 km). Three crucial ques-
tions should be put:
(a/ Should we not aim at a zero option for
SNF, the so-called third zero option?
(b) If not, is replacement of the current
weapon system necessary?
(c) When should a decision about such
replacement be taken?
Your Rapporteur offers the following views:
(a) We should not give up hope of a
nuclear weapon-free world. But it
requires much more than a balance in
conyentional armaments to realise
this. In history, conventional arma-
ments have never deterred aggressorsl
nuclear armaments, however, have. In
Europe we have not had a war for
more than forty-three years. That is
the longest period without an armed
conflict between European countries
since the Middle Ages, in spite of a
cold war and serious tensions as
during the rebellions of the people in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Very
few deny that we owe this to nuclear
deterrence. Therefore, we need a mix
of conventional and nuclear arma-
ments, even in a situation of balance
between conventional armed forces at
a lower level. We can think of dis-
posing of nuclear weapons only in a
future where the political situation has
profoundly changed for the better; and
for that we still have a very long way to
go.
Ofcourse, there are encouraging devel-
opments in Eastern Europe. A new
wind blows in the Soviet Union and
the events in Poland and particularlyin Hungary give us hope that civil
rights will be more and more
respected. But we have to see if this
will continue. and besides that there
are very dark facts. In Romania and
Bulgana, their own people and espe-
cially the cultural minorities are
severely oppressed. In Czechoslovakia
the author Havel and others from
Charter "7J have been arrested.
Activists for human rights like
Vevelka and Petrova were recently
sentenced to prison because on 18th
January they demonstrated on the spot
where Jan Palach set himself on fire 20
years ago. As long as we cannot be
absolutely sure of the good intentions
of the regimes in Eastern Europe, we
cannot afford to abandon deterrence
by nuclear weapons.
The Hague platform mentions very
rightly that " to be credible and
effective, the strategy ofdeterrence and
defence must continue to be based on
an adequate mix of appropriate
nuclear and conventional forces, only
the nuclear element of which can con-
front a potential aggressor with an
unacceptable risk ".
(b) We cannot avoid the replacement of
the Lance. Otherwise the missiles
would become obsolete and hnally lose
their credibility as a deterrent. The
Warsaw Pact has here too a prepon-
derance over NATO. The following
summary shows this quite clearlyrr:
the framework of the comprehensive
concept. SOWs are launched from an
aircrafl or a submarine and can hit a
(c) The question is, by what system the
Lance should be replaced and if it
should necessarily be land-based? The
possibility of a stand-off weapon(SOW) system should be covered in
t2
NATO and France
Year Range Warhead(s) Number
Lance
Pluton
r972
1974
110 km
120 km
1-100 Kt
15- 25 Kr
88
32
Warsaw Pact
Year Range Warhead(s) Number
Frog
Scud
t957 I 1965
1 965
70 km
300 km
200 Kt
?
868
191
I l. See " Atlantrc News " (editron 1988/8-9).
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target some hundreds of kilometres
away. The Soviets have a problem in
reconsidering their own position and
even greater problems in changing
their philosophy. Our own concerns
will have to be applied to future lower
levels of forces and we shall certainly
need a period of technical and tactical
research before we make a sensible
decision. Besides, a definitive decision
at present would cast an unnecessary
shadow on the CFE talks and that
would not be in the interests of either
party. The countries of WEU should
do all the necessary research and make
all the preparations for the production
of the successor to Lance, but take the
final decision on production in, say,
two or three years' time. Then we
can decide about numbers, depending
on the political situation. In the
meantime. no valuable time will be
lost.
IX. The Western European perspective
9.1. We Western Europeans have been fairly
ambivalent on many questions of arms control.
We sat back and listened to the debates between
the two superpowers on nuclear weapons,
without feeling too concerned ourselves
(although we paid lip-service to the conclusions
and, at least here in the Assembly, encouraged
the ratification of the treaty (Resolution 77
adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December
1987). We have had a more active role in the
debates in Geneva at the Conference on Disarm-
ament and have even taken the initiative, as a
result of the French-sponsored gathering on
chemical weapons in Paris in January, in trying
to give fresh impetus to deliberations which were
showing signs of slowing down (albeit that these
talks concern weapons which each of our states,
bound by the provisions of the Brussels Treaty,
declares formally every year not to possess).
9.2. Now, with the mandate for negotiation on
conventional armed forces in Europe, we
Western European Union members are all
directly and inextricably concerned in arms
control: the control of armaments which are not
arms for deterrence (conventional arms have
rarely deterred any would-be aggressor), which
are not the nuclear weapons one hopes will never
be used, but the " every-day ", " ordinary " arms
like tanks, guns and troops. These discussions
are not about the supposed end of the world,
which is incomprehensible, but about weapons
for invasion and occupation which many people
living today in our nations have experienced per-
sonally. That is why the Europeans must con-
tribute directly, as Europeans first and foremost,
in Vienna and never lose sight of the fact that
these negotiations are crucial for the reduction
and even eventually the elimination of any sense
of threat to our security and independence. A
first practical and immediately feasible step in
the right direction would be for the country
which is Chairman-in-Offrce of the Council to
establish in its delegation in Vienna, a WEU
Iiaison officer for the CFE talks.
l3
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APPENDIX
Mandate for negotiation on conventional armed forces I in Europe
The representatives of Belgium, Bulgaria,
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the
German Democratic Republic, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece. Hungary, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America held
consultations in Vienna from 17th February
1987 to lOth January 1989.
These states,
Conscious of the common responsibility'
which they all have for seeking to achieve greater
stability and security in Europe;
Acknowledging that it is their armed
forces which bear most immediately on the
essential security relationship in Europe, in par-
ticular as they are signatories of the treaties of
Brussels (1948), Washington (1949) or Warsaw(1955), and accordingly are members of the
North Atlantic Alliance or parties to the Warsaw
Treaty;
Recalling that they are all participants in
the CSCE process;
Recalling that, as reaff,rrmed in the Hel-
sinki Final Act, they have the right to belong or
not to belong to international organisations, to
be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral
treaties including the right to be or not to be a
party to treaties of alliance;
Determined that a negotiation on conven-
tional armed forces in Europe should take place
in the framework of the CSCE process;
Reaffirming also that they participate in
negotiations as sovereign and independent states
and on the basis of full equality;
Have agreed on the following provisions:
Participants
The participants in this negotiation shall
be the 23 above-listed states hereinafter referred
to as " the participants ".
Objectfues and methods
The objectives of the negotiation shall be
to strengthen stability and security in Europe
through the establishment of a stable and secure
balance of conventional armed forces, whichinclude conventional armaments and
equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of
1. Conventronal armed forces
ments and equipment.
disparities prejudicial to stability and security;
and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of
the capability for launching surprise attack and
for initiating large-scale oflensive action. Each
and every participant undertakes to contribute to
the attainment of these objectives.
These objectives shall be achieved by the
application of militarily significant measures
such as reductions, limitations, redeployment
provisions, equal ceilings, and related measures,
among others.
In order to achieve the above objectives,
measures should be pursued for the whole area of
application with provisions, if and where appro-
priate, for regional differentiation to redress dis-
parities within the area of application and in a
way which precludes circumvention.
The process of strengthening stability and
security should proceed step-by-step, in a
manner which will ensure that the security of
each participant is not affected adversely at any
stage.
Scope and area of application
The subject ofthe negotiation shall be the
conventional armed forces, which include con-
ventional armaments and equipment, of the par-
ticipants based on land within the territory of the
participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals.
The existence of multiple capabilities will
not be a criterion for modifying the scope of the
negotiation:
- 
No conventional armaments or
equipment will be excluded from the subject of
the negotiation because they may have other
capabilities in addition to conventional ones.
Such armaments or equipment will not be
singled out in a separate category;
- 
Nuclear weapons will not be a subject of
this negotiation.
Particular emphasis will initially be placed
on those forces directly related to the
achievement of the objectives of the negotiation
set out above.
Naval forces and chemical weapons will
not be addressed.
The area of application shall be the entire
land territory of the participants in Europe from
the Atlantic to the Urals. which includes all the
European island territories ofthe participants. In
the case of the Soviet Union the area of appli-
cation includes all the territory lying west of the
t4
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Ural River and the Caspian Sea. In the case of
Turkey the area of application includes the ter-
ritory of Turkey north and west of the following
line: the point of intersection of the border with
the 39th parallel, Muradiye, Patnos, Karayazi,
Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Dogankent.
Gozne and thence to the sea.
Exchange of inforntation and verffication
Compliance with the provisions of any
agreement shall be verified through an effective
and strict verification regime which, among
other things, will include on-site inspections as a
matter of right and exchanges of information.
Information shall be exchanged in suffi-
cient detail so as to allow a meaningful com-
parison of the capabilities of the forces involved.
Information shall also be exchanged in sufficient
detail so as to provide a basis for the verification
of compliance.
The specific modalities for verification
and the exchange of information, including the
degree of detail of the information and the order
ofits exchange, shall be agreed at the negotiation
proper.
Procedures and other arrangenrcnts
The procedures for the negotiation,
including the agenda, work programme and
timetable, working methods, hnancial issues and
other organisational modalities, as agreed by the
participants themselves, are set out in Annex I 2
of this mandate. They can be changed only by
consensus of the participanls.
The participants decided to take part in
meetings of the states signatories of the Helsinki
Final Act to be held at least twice during each
round of the negotiation on conventional armed
forces in Europe in order to exchange views and
substantive information concerning the course of
the negotiation on conventional armed forces in
Europe. Detailed modalities for these meetings
are contained in Annex 22 to this mandate.
The participants will take into consider-
ation the views expressed in such meetings by
other CSCE participating states concerning their
own security.
Participants will also provide information
bilaterally.
The participants undertake to inform the
next CSCE follow-up meeting of their work and
possible results and to exchange views, at that
meeting, with the other CSCE participating states
on progress achieved in the negotiation.
The participants foresee that, in the light
of circumstances at the time, they will provide in
their timetable for a temporary suspension to
permit this exchange of views. The appropriate
time and duration of this suspension is their sole
responsibility.
Any modification of this mandate is the
sole responsibility of the participants, whether
they modify it themselves or concur in its modi-
fication at a future CSCE follow-up meeting.
The results of the negotiation will be deter-
mined only by the participants.
Character of agreentents
Agreements reached shall be interna-
tionally binding. Modalities for their entry into
force will be decided at the negotiation.
Venue
The negotiation shall commence in
Vienna no later than in the seventh week fol-
lowing the closure of the Vienna CSCE
meeting.
Extracts from Annex 2 to the
mandate for negotiation on conventional
urmed forces in Europe
Statement of lhe Representative of Denmark
On behalf of the Government of
Denmark. I wish to confirm that the Faroe
Islands are included in the area of application for
the negotiation on conventional armed forces in
Europe.
Statement of the Representative of Norwal'
On behalf of the Government of Norway, I
confirm that Svalbard including Bear Island, is
included in the area ofapplication for the negoti-
ation on conventional armed forces in Europe.
Statement of the Representative of Portugal
The islands of Azores and Madeira have
by right the status of European islands. It has
been agreed in the mandate that all the European
island territories ofthe participants are included
in the area ofapplication. I can therefore state on
behalf of my Government that the Azores and
Madeira are within the area of application for the
negotiation on conventional armed forces in
Europe.
Stateilent of the Representative of Spain
On behalf of the Government of Spain, I
confirm that the Canary Islands are included in
the area of application for the negotiation on
conventional armed forces in Europe.
Statement of the Representative of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
On behalf of the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I confirm
that Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya are
included in the area of application for the negoti-
ation on conventional armed forces in Europe.
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